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THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
During the last month the Allison Society has developed along two very important lines of growth. An increased
attendance and a growing interest have
been the two features most distinctly
characteristic of the meetings.
While the regular order of exercises has
not been abandoned, more prominence
than heretofore has been given to extemporaneous speaking upon subjects assigned
by the President.
Questions of parliamentary law, arising
during the transaction of business, have
also been discussed with a thoroughness,
which has frequently prolonged the meetings far beyond the usual hour of adjournment.
The meeting on the evening of May l1th
was one of exceptional importance. For
some time a number of Allison men had
been of opinion that some slight changes
in the Constitution would be advisable,
and a committee on revision had been appointed. At this meeting the committee
reported several changes, which promise
to be of great benefit to the society.
At the meeting of May 18th the following officers were elected:
President-Graul.
First Vice President-Adamson.
Secretary-Nicholls.
Treasurer-Lauer.

Executive Committee-Shipman, Alexander and Valentine.
Under the amended Constitution the
other officers are appointed by the President.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The Dickinson Society closed the work
for the school year-the most prosperous
year in its history-on Friday evening,
May 25th, when an able corps of officers,
consisting entirely of members of the
Junior class, was installed. Every inember of the organization already looks forward to the work of next term, when t hey
are all determined that even better work
shall be done than has been done in the
past year and years.
On the evening of April 27th the question, "Resolved, That Quay should have
been seated," was ably discussed affirmatively by Messrs. Minnick andTrude, and
negatively by Messrs. Hess and Rhodes.
In the -general debate which followed, and
in whicii the same question was discussed,
nearly all the members present participated.
The evening of Friday, May 4th, was
similarly spent in the discussion of the
question, "Resolved, That the United
States was justified in waging the late war
against Spain." Those who argued the
question on this occasion were, affirma-
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tively Messrs. Aubrey and Shellenberger,
and negatively Messrs. Winlack and
Trude.
On the Friday evening following Messrs.
Rhodes and Davis argued the affirmative
side of the question, "Resolved, That the
South has done more for the real benefit of
the negro than the North," while Messrs.
Light and Osborne upheld the negative.
The program of May 18th contained a
debate on the question, "Resolved, That
those who can neither read nor write
should be disfranchised;" discussed affirmatively by Messrs. Stauffer and F. Rhodes,
and negatively by Messrs. J. Rhodes and
Hess; also a violin solo by Mr. H. S. Winlack.
The following officers were installed on
Friday evening, May 25th, which evening
was given up entirely to that exercise:
President-J. L. Rhodes.
Vice President-C. S. Davis.
Secretary-F. H. Rhodes.
Executive Committee-W. S. Clark, C.
S. Davis and F. L. Hess.
Treasurer-W. H. Trude.
District Attorney-R. K. MacConnell.
Sheriff-J. N. Minnich.
Sergeant-at-Arms-W. H. Points.
Prothonotary-W. S. Detrich.
Warden-W. T. Osborne.
Clerk of Court-W. R. Talbot.
Constable-R. H. Moon.
Register of Wills-E. A. Bowers.
WEORCAN CLUB.
The Weorcan Club held its closing meeting for this school year on May 23. Its
members, realizing as they do the benefits
which they have derived from its proceedings and the still greater benefits which
might in the future be derived from the
organization, regret exceedingly that the
time has come to part. The members all
look back -with pleasure to the various
meetings which this club has had during
the year,-meetings which were not only
pleasant and interesting but which were
also as instructive hs they could well be
made.
The officers of the Club during the last
administration were:
President-L. P. Coblentz.
Vice President-A. Light.

Secretary-H. W. Russell.
Critic-W. A. Valentine.

THE ANNUAL CLASS GAME.
On the seventh of May, the Juniors having issued the challenge, which was duly
accepted, the 'annual baseball game took
place between the Junior and Middle
classes. It created unbounded enthusiasm
but the class of '00, the victors of last year's
contest, were again triumphant and their
laurels are still green. The work of the
two teams was very satisfactory, but few
errors being made. Captain Hess, of the
'00 team, was rather wild but the hits off
his delivery were few and at no time was
the result of the game in doubt. Russell
relieved him in the eighth inning and succeeded in sustaining his reputation. Capt.
Lauer saw fit to place Adamson in the box
for the team of '01, and barring the opening innings he pitched a very creditable
game.
The face of Dean Trickett.was seen on the
bleachers. The final score by innings here
follows:
Middle Class ........... 10 1 3 0 2 3 0 0 1-20
Juniors ................... 262003010-14
DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
Philip M. Graul, '01, of Lehighton, Carbon county, was initiated into this fraternity on Friday, May 7th.
Messrs. Mitchell, '01, and John, '00, were
the delegates of the fraternity to the National Convention, held in New York City
during the first week of April.
ALUMNI NOTES.
D. Edward Long, '99, spent a short time
in Carlisle during the past week.
We quote the following from the Kane
Leader:
Neil C. MacEwen, Esq., has disposed of
his law practice to his brother, B. Johnston
MacEwen, and will retire temporarily at
least from active practice. The reason assigned is the pressing need of attention to
other business and the desire to get out of
office work which has proved too severe a
tax upon Mr. MacEwen's health. The
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inducement, too, offered by the younger
brother is said to have been a factor in the
deal.
We are )leased to quote the following
appreciative book notice from the Pittsburg Legal Journal:
"THE LAW OF GUARDIANS IN
WILLIAM
By
PENNSYLVANIA.
TRIcxETr, LL. D., Dean of the Dickinson School of Law: T. & J. W. Joiston & Co., Philadelphia, publishers.
"The publishers have an established
reputation in getting out law books, and
when a work is published by this firm the
legal profession relies on its being a firstclass law book, They will not be disappointed in Mr. Trickett's work on Guardians in Pennsylvania. It is an excellent
book, and fully sustains the reputation of
the author. established by his other publications, as particularly Trickett on Liens.
" The subject of ' Guardians' is not an
extensive one, but there is enough in it to
fill one volume without padding or verboseness. The work contains a full quotation and citation of authorities and Acts of
Assembly, with a discussion of the Drinciples of the law and practice. In ti back
of the book is a complete collection of forms
for all proceedings in court in relation to a
guardian's business.
"The forms here given are simple and
concise, very much according to the practice and desires of the Allegheny county
judges and attorneys. We can unhesitatingly recommend the book."
The following is an extract from a letter
by Jxsstice Dean, of the Supreme Court,
concerning Dr. Tiickett's work on Guardians :
"Am especially pleased with chapter 35,
on sales of land. Slovenly conducted proceedings by guardians for sale of wards'
lands have so often been the cause of subsequent litigation, that I do not hesitate
to express the opinion, that your perspicuous statement of the law and the meithod
of procedure, will tend greatly to relief
from future litigation. The entire book is
excellent."

MOOT COURT.
WILLIAM MOWERY vs. ARTHUR
DOWNES.
Tort-Damages-Proximatecause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Mowery, the plaintiff, owns a
house and lot on West street. Arthur
Downes, on Feb. 1, 1900, maliciously and
willfully shot a dog belonging to Mowery,
which was lying i4 Mowery's front yard.
The wounded dog ran into the open door
of the plaintiff's house, knocking him
down. In fallin, his head struck a door,
and lie sustained injuries amounting to
Be brings suit to recover that
$1,000.
amount.
GRAUL and BRENNAN for the plaintiff.
1. Plaintiff must recover, for the act of
defendant was a tort, and the consequences
are such as are proximate under the rule
of proximate cause in torts. Drake v.
Kiely, 93 Pa. 495; Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W.
BI. 892 ; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y.
396.
KLINE and DRUMHELLER for tile defendant.
1. The cause was too remote. Fairbanks
v. Kerr, 70 Pa. 86; Drake v. Kiely, 93 Pa.
495; Township of W. Mahanoy v. Watson,
112 Pa. 574.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

On Feb. 1, 1900, Arthur Downes maliciously and willfully shot a dog belonging
to Mowery, which was lying in the front
yard of Mowery's premises, on West street.
The wounded dog ran into the open door
of the plaintiff's house, knocking hiri
down. In falling, his head struck a door,
and he sustained injuries amounting to
one thousand dollars, to recover which
this suit is now brought.
It is submitted by counsel for defendant
that there is no cause of action shown,
that the result was such as the defendant
could not have foreseen, and that the injury sustained was not the proximate result of the act of the defendant. They
therefore urge that the maxim, " Causa
proxima non remota spectatur," applies.
Ordinarily the question of what amounts
to proximate cause is for the jury, but
where there isan admitted and undisputed
state of facts, it becomes the duty of the
court to determine whether the injury was
proximate or not. Mack v. Lombard, 8
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C. C. R. 305; Hoag v. Railroad, 4 Norris
293; Township v. Watson, 112 Pa. 574.
According to the weight of authority,
the application of this maxim to the case
before us would be erroneous and unjust.
It i true. there is an intervening agency
between the defendant's act and the injury sustained; yet an intervening agency
does not always shield a wrongdoer from
responsibility when the injury flows from
his wrongful act. The principle of law
seems to be well settled, that whoever does
an illegal or wrongful act is answerable for
all the consequences that ensue in the
ordinary and natural course of events,
though such consequences be brought
about by an intervening agency, if suclh
agenoy were set in motion by the primary
wrongdoer. Cooley, Torts, 70; Vanderbaugh v. Truax, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 464; Wick
v. Lauder, 75 Ill. 93; Wasmerv. Delaware
& R. R. Co., 80 N. Y. 212; Billman v. Indianapolis R. R. Co., 76 Ind. 166; Jeffersonville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind.
568; Drake v. Kiely, 93 Pa. 492 ; and the
famous squib case, S~ott v. Shepherd, 2W.
B1. 892.
The case of Vanderbaugh v. Truax, supra, is somewhat similar to the case before
us, the facts of which are, briefly, as follows: The defendant engaged in a, altercation with a negro boy, and frightened
him with a weapon. The boy, pursued
by the defendant, fled from him, and in
the course of his flight ran into the store
of his employer, and, striking against a
faucet of a cask of wine, caused the wine
to be spilled and lost. It was held that
the defendant was liable to the owner,
The doctrine laid down in the case of
Guither v. Swan, 19 Johnson, cited by
plaintiff's counsel, is extended much beyond that which would be necessary to
support the.plaintiff's claim in this case.
It was there held that one who ascended
in a balloon, and came down upon the
garden of another, was liable for the injury caused by a crowd of persons attracted
to the garden by the descent of the balloon.
In another case, that of Wasmer v. Delaware R. R. Co., s-upra, the Supreme Court
held that a railway company was liable
for any injury done by a runaway horse,
the cause of the horse's fright being the

negligent manner in which the company's
servants ran a locomotive through the
streets of Utica. It was likewise held in
the case of Bielman v. Indianapolis R. R.
Co., 76 Ind. 166, thatif one, by a negligent
act, frightens horses, causing them to run
away, he becomes liable forthe injury that
may result, since it is but the natural and
probable consequences of his wrong. It
may be foreseen that the horses being
frightened would run away, and such running away may and probably would cause
injury, In the case before us, was it an
unnatural or improbable result that the
dog, being wounded, should flee into his
master's house with all possible speed,
and, in this frightened and probably bleeding state, some damage would result therefrom, for example, some valuable rugs may
have been destroyed ? It is not necessary
that he should have foreseen the nature
or extent of such injury as might result.
To so hold would be requiring entirely too
much in the interest of the wrongdoers.
Drake v. Kiely, supra; Hill v. Winson,
118 Mass. 287. Our conclusion, therefore,
is according to the principle laid down in
the foregoing line of authority, that the
injury for which a recovery is sought is
not so remote from the original wrong as
to defeat the right to recover for the damages flowing from said injury.
Some courts have held that where the
original act was willful or malum in se,
that the wrongdoer should be held liable
for remote causes. Jeffersonville R. R. Co.
v. Riley, supra; Forney v. Gedmaeher, 75
Mo. 113; Scheffer v. Washington City R.
Co., 105 U. S. 249. This principle is also
set forth in the Amn. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law, Vol. 16, p. 434, in the following sentence: "The true principle is, that where
an act is malum in se or willful, the persou guilty of it is liable for all the consequences, however remote, because the act
is quasi criminal in its character, and the
law conclusively presumes that all the
consequences were foreseen and intended."
Being therefore of the opinion that the
defendant is liable for all the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, let judgment be
entered for the sum of one thousand dollars
in favor of the plaintiff.
ROBERT HAYS SUITH, J.
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Arthur Downes, the defendant in this
case, maliciously shot a dog belonging to
William Mowery, the plaintiff. The dog
ran into the house, and knocked the plaintiff down. The plaintiff, in falling, sustained injuries to the extent of $1,000, for
which amount he now brings action.
The single question involved in this
case is, whether the act of Downes, in
shooting the dog, was the proximate cause
of Mowery's injuries.
This question, the factaof the case being
undisputed, is for the court to decide.
Township v. Watson, 112 Pa. 574, and
cases there cited.
Proximate cause has been defined as
follows in Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R.
*
*
Co., 85 Pa. 293, by Paxson, J. *
"The true rule is, that the injury must be
the natural and probable consequence of
the defendant's negligence-such a consequence as, under the surrounding circumstanced of the case, might and ought to
have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as
likely to flow from his act." Substantially
the same definition will be found in Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.
S. 469; 2 Thompson on Negligence, 1085;
Pollock on Torts, 36; and in the reports of
nearly all the States in the Union.
Do Downes' act and Mowery's injury
bear such a relation to one another that,
in the light of the above rule, the act may
be held to be the proximate cause of the
injury ?
Downes shot the dog. When an ordinarily reasonable man shoots a dog, it is
within his contemplation that he may
wound, instead of kill, the animal. When
wounded, and capable of running, animals
become terrorized, and run about wildly.
Downes must be held to have contemplated
this.
Did Downes contemplate injury to a
human being? It is within the knowledge apd contemplation of ordinarily
reasonable men that a terrorized animal
loses its tractability and regard for people
or things, and that it will blindly collide
with objects or human beings, to their
evident risk of injury. Downes must be
held to have contemnplated injury to persons, and consequently the injury to
Mowery.
We hold that Downes' act was the prox

imate-cause of Mowery's injury; and since
there is no dispute as to the amount of
damage, we direct the jury to find for the
plaintiff in the sum of $1,000.
LENTZ, J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The shooting of the dog by Downes was
"willful and malicious." That the dog,
thus shot, ran into the house, and, in doing so, knocked down the plaintiff, and
that the plaintiff, in consequence, has
suffered a severe injury, are not remarkable and peculiar. It is not necessary that
the particular result should have been
foreseeable, or even that it should have
seemed likely that some event of the narrow class to which it belongs would happen. The case of Isham v. Dow, 70 Vt.
588, is sufficiently similar to this, and the
doctrine of it sufficiently fortified by reason
and authority to justify the decision
reached by the learned court below.
Judgment affirmed.

ANNIE SHELLY vs. BOROUGH OF
CARLISLE.
Trespass.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The defendant passed an ordinance providing that no horse, mule or other beast
should be driven faster than an ordinary
gait in the streets of the borough. The
husband of the plaintiff drove his fire-engine on a run through the streets, and ran
against an obstruction in the street, which
had been put there by the borough authorities, and was not lighted or guarded in
any manner. The fireman was thrown
off and killed. The borough owned the
fire dorartment, and had taken out accident policies for the firemen. The company paid for Shelly's death $1,000, which
was paid to the plain tiff. She brings this
action for $5,000 for damages sustained on
account of the death.
HOLCOMB and ELMES, attorneys for the
plaintiff.
1. A master is liable to his servant for
injuries happeningin the courseof his employment. 25 N.Y. 565; 187 Pa. 287. 2. A town is liable for the acts of its
agents in not keeping the street clear. 172
Pa. 408.
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L. FLOYD HESS, attorney for the defendant.
1. City acted in governmental capacity,
and, as such, has immunity from damages
caused by negligence of agent. Freeman
v. City, 7. W. N C. 45; Hofiord v. City, 16
Gray 297 ; Elliott v. rity, 7 Phila. 128;
Davis v. Corry, 154 Pa. 602; Borough v.
Apple, 35 Pa. 284; Alcorn v. City, 44 Pa.
348.
2. As an agent, defendant was affected
with notice of the obstacle which-his principal had; and it was negligence per se to
take that road. As to notice see Danville
B. Com. v. Pomeroy, 15 Pa. 151. As to
negligence see Hoven v. Pitts. & All. B.
Co., 151 Pa. 620; Shaw v. Phila., 159 Pa.
487; Wellman v. Boro. of S. Depot, 167
Pa. 239.
3. As a servant, he accepted the risks 6f
his employment. Patterson v. Pittsburg
R. R. Co., 76 Pa. 393; Sykes v. Parker 11
W. N. 494; Payne v. Reese, 12 W. N. 97.
4. If husband could not recover, neither
can the wife. If this policy was accepted
as a consideration for release, she is barred.
Hill v. Pa. R. R. Co., 178 Pa. 223; Lancaster v. Kissinger, 1 W. N. 157.
5. A corporation, like a natural person,
is responsible only for the effects which
an ordinary person could foresee. Eisenbrey v. City, 24 W,. N. 231; Morrison v.
)avis, 20 Pa. 170; Hunter v. Wanamaker,
17 W. N. 232; Schaefer v. Jackson, 150 Pa.
149.
6. There is no evidence as to the nature
of the obstacle, or that a person would be
damaged if traveling at an ordinary gait.
Therefore, the borough's liability is measured by the extent of the ordinance, and
the plaintiff's exceeding that is contributory negligence, of which the slightest
amount will bar. Campbell v. City of
York, 172 Pa. 208; Davis v. Corry, 154 Pa.
600; Mathnire v. Erie City, 144 Pa. 14;
Oil City Co. v. Boundy, 122 Pa. 449; Morristown v. Moyer, 167 Pa. 355.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The question for our decision, suggested
by the facts before us, is whether or not a
municipality may be held liable in damages for the death of one of its employees
of one of its departments, sustained while
in the discharge of his duties, and caused
by negligence in another department.
The cases heretofore adjudicated, bearing upon this point, leading among which
is Freeman v. Philadelphia, 7 W. N. C.
45, establish it to be the law that a fire department, owned and controlled as in this
case b the municipality, is a part of the
municipal machinery. Toquote from the
case cited, supra, "Municipal corporaions, to the extent that they are author-

ized or directed to exercise public governmental powers and to perform public
governmental duties solely for the general
good, are governmental agencies, and are.
entitled to immunity in respect to the acts
of their subordinate officers or agents. *
* * * The municipal corporation is but
the representative of the State or of the
public, and the officers or individuals employed are not the employees of the corporation, but are public officers exercising
acts for the common good." TheBorough
of Carlisle, then, in the case at bar, acted
in a governmental capacity in its employment of Shelly in the fire department,
and he, in accepting that employment,
must be assumed to have accepted also the
risks incident to his duties. The borough
is therefore immune from responsibility in
damages to the plaintiff, because of the
death of her husband, caused by the negligence or otherwise of the borough's agents.
We may, in reason, go a step farther than
did the court in tAme case cited and say,
that it matters not that the injury or consequences of the negligence of its servants
in one department were visited upon one
engaged in another department of city
government, the same principle of the
municipality's immunity still obtains.
The fire department exists as a part of the
municipality, not for the immediate benefit of that municipality, but for the common good of the community at large.
Shelly's service was therefore rendered
rather to humanity than to the municipal
corporation-the Borough of Carlisle.
The fact that the borough provided and
paid the premiums on a $1,000 life insurance policy for each one of its employees
in the fire department, and that in this
case the amount of said policy on Shelly's
life was paid to the plaintiff, cannot be
construed to be a confession of the borough's responsibility for injury or death
sustained by its firemen while in discharge
of duty; nor can it be interpreted to be a
waiver of the immunity secured to it by
the decisions of the courts. The provision
for these policies was rather made, in contemplation of the great danger which a
fireman must frequently face, to act as an
incentive to volunteers, and to cause men
to enlist their services and accept the risks
attendant upon the duties of fireman.
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From the mere statement that Shelly
"drove his fire engine on a run through
the streets," even though in violation of
one of the ordinances of the borough, there
is not sufficient ground to warrant our decision or the sending to the jury the question of contributory negligence. This we
therefore dismiss.
Upon all of the facts of the case, and the
law thereto applied, we decide that there
is no legal responsibility upon the part of
the Borough of Carlisle, and a recovery by
the widow is therefore.dbnied.
By the court.
A. F. JoHN, J.
The counsel for defendant argued that
the city acted in a governmental capacity,
and as such has immunity from damages
caused by negligence of agent.
In this I think he was right. Municipal corporations, to the extent that they
are authorized or directed to exercise public governmental powers, and perform
governmental agencies, are entitled to immunity in respect to the acts of their subordinate officers or agents, they being
auxiliaries of the government.
In Freeman v. City of Phila., 7 W. N. 45,
it was held that the city acted in a governmental capacity, and was not responsible for the negligent acts of firemen, but
the 4njured party was compelled to bring
the action against the fireman himself.
In the next place the ordinance provides
that there shall be no traveling within
the borough limits faster than an ordinary
gait. The meaning of ordinary gait is to
be derived from the average rate of travel
within the city streets, and it is fair to
suppose that it does not mean the rate of
speed employed by the fireman at the time
of the accident. As was said in Davis v.
Corry, 154 Pa. 600, cited by the defendant,
that every essential element must be made
out by the plaintiff ere he can recover, and
to establish negligence upon the part of
the borough authorities it is essential that
the obstacle be shown to be such an one as
was dangerous to life or limb of the traveling public while traveling at an ordinary
gait. Or, at least, that in the minds of
reasonable men, it was such an obstacle as
to be a menace to the public safety. A
corporation, like a natural person, is only
liable for the effects which an ordinary

person could foresee. Hunter v. Wanamaker, 17 W. N. 232; Shaefer v. Jackson,
150 Pa. 149. This the plaintiff failed to
do. I think that the effect of this borough
ordinance was to limit the responsibility
of the borough to accidents occurring
while traveling at an ordinary gait. To
hold otherwise would be to declare that
the ordinance was of no effect, and that
the law-breaker cduld take advantage of
his own recklessness and recover. While
it may work a hardship in this particular
instance, until the plaintiff makes out
that this obstacle was dangerous at an ordinary rate of speed, he cannot recover.
This ordinance acted as a guard just the
same as any railing would; and it would
not be contended that had there been
guards around the obstacle the plaintiff
could recover. There are many obstacles
in the city streets and elsewhere that are
free from accidents only because there has
been legislation concerning them, which,
to break, was in effect to be guilty of contributory negligence. For these reasons I
am of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot recover.

L. L.

FRANK, X.

JOHN SMITH vs. N. Y. LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Insurancepolicy- Wagering transaction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On Jan. 1, 1895, Mr. Jones took out a
policy of life insurance for five thousand
dollars ($5,000) in the defendant company.
In this policy John Smith was made the
beneficiary. Smith lent Jones the money
with which to pay premiums until Jan. 1,
1898. On Jan. 10, 1898, Jones died under
suspicious circumstances. Smith was indicted for murder and found guilty. His
case is now before the Supreme Court on
alppeal. He now brings this suit to recover the insurance.
PIPER and TRUDE for the plaintiff.
1. When a person effects an insurance
on his life, and in the policy designates
another as payee of the sum, the latter can
maintain an action on the policy without
showing an insurable interest in the life.
Scott v. Dickson Adnis., 16 W. N. C. 181;
Fohner'sAppeal, 87 Pa. 133; Cunningham
v. Smith's Admr., 70 Pa. 450.
2. A person may receive money due him
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on the death of a person, notwithstanding
the fact that he caused the death of such
person. Carpenter's Appeal, 170 Pa. 203.
EDWARDS and DEEBLE for the defendant.
1. A man cannot be made a beneficiary
in an insurance policy unless he has an
insurable interest. To have an insurable
interest he must be a creditor or a relative.
Shafer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223; Ulrich v.
Reinoehl, 143 Pa. 238; Corson v. McLean,
113 Pa. 438.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question is whether or not the beneficiary in this case was a credit6r of the
insured so as to establish an insurable interest in the said John Smith, or whether
the policy was a mere wager.
In this case Jones took out the policy on
his life for S5,000 in the defendant company, in which John Smith was made
beneficiary. Smith lent Jones the money
with which to pay the premiums until
January 1, 1898. The beneficiary bore no
relation, either lineal or collateral, to
the insured so as to give him an insurable
interest in the life of the deceased. Neither
did he bear to the insured the relation of
debtor and creditor. When Jones took
out the policy on his life, Smith lent him
the money with which to pay the premiums for three years, and after that period of time it seenis that the insured was
to pay the premiums himself. This precludes still more clearly the relation of a
creditor to the insured, than if ie had
undertaken to pay the premiums on the
policy at all times.
The three years had expired nine days previous to the death of the insured, and after
the threeyears had expired the premiums
for the ensuing years would have had -to
be paid by some person, and as the facts
clearly state that Smith lent the money
for only three years, we must presume that
after the three years had elapsed Jones
was to pay the premiums ; and if he had
not, the policy would have expired, and
there would have been no miight of action
against the insurance company.
The facts of this case leave us in quite a
disagreeable position, as they do not state
either the age of the insured, or the amount
of money which he paid yearly for pre
miums; but we think that it is fair to presume, in the absence of anything to the
contrary, that he was a middle aged man,

which, in our judgment, would be from
thirty to thirty-five years of age. His being of that age would lessen the amount
that he would be compelled to pay yearly
for premiums if he were
an older
man; and if he was of that age, the
amount that the beneficiary would be
compelled to pay for the three years for
premiums would not exceed in our opinion
$300 or $400. And we must remember
that the beneficiary lent the money only
for three payments, and after that time
the insured was compelled to pay the premiums himself. And again, we must note
that at the time the policy was taken out
there was no pre-existing indebtedness
between the insured and beneficiary.
Now, the law is well settled that a
creditor has an insurable interest in the
life of a debtor, and may lawfully take out
a policy in such sum as may reasonably
secure his debt, but not in such gross disproportion to the amount of his debt that
it may lead to evil results; for a policy
taken out by one who has no interest,
either as a creditor or a relative, in the
life of the assured, is always a danger-signal. Now, we must consider whether the
disproportion between the amount of the
debt and the amount of the insurance
policy is so great as to make it a wagering
policy.
In Ulrich v. Reinoehl, 143 Pa. 238, it
was held that where a policy of $3,000 was
taken out to cover a debt of $110, it
was a wagering policy, the disproportion
between the two sums being so great as to
require the judges to say, as a matter of
law, that the transaction was a wager,
and that the assignor of the policy bad no
right to retain more of the insurance
money than to pay the premiums plus
the interest. Now, after considering
all the facts of this case, and considering the difference in amount between
the debt and the amount of the policy,
and considering the fact that the beneficiary would notlle compelled to pay more
than the three premiums, we think that
it is clearly a wagering policy. The disproportion betweei the debt and the policy
is so great as to make it clearly a wagering
policy, and therefore we are of 1he opinion
thatthe plaintiff cannot recover.
L. L. FRANK, J.
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The question' involved in this case is,
whether this policy falls within that class
known as speculating and wagering. If
so, the plaintiff's claim is untenable,
That a policy of this nature may be enforced against the company, certain relalions must exist as between the insured
and beneficiary. The beneficiary, it seems,
must have an interest, as relative or creditor, in the life of the insured. Did Smith
have an interest as such in the life of
Jones? Jones took out this policy for
$5,000, and made Smith the beneficiary,
Smith lent Jones the money to pay the
premiums for three years, from the issuing
of the policy on Jan. 1, 1895, until Jan. 1,
1898. Jones died on Jan. 10,1898. It does
not appear that Jones was indebted to
Smith prior to the taking out of the policy,
nor does it appear that he wps a relative
of Smith. We are unable to see how
Smith. from the statement of facts, could
have an insurable interest in the life of
Jones. Nor are we of opinion that the
mere loaning of the money to Jones for
the payment of the assessments for three
years established the relation of debtor and
creditor so as to create an insurable interest in Jones' life. We have seen that he
had no such interest as relative; and also,
that there was no prior indebtedness when
the policy was taken out. From those
facts alone the policy might be termed a
mere wager, and therefore void. Even if
the amount of the premiums paid be considered as a debt, the policy being to securethat debt, the plaintiff cannot recover,
the disproportion of the debt to the amount
of the insurance being so great as to make
it a wagering policy, and such policy being Void in law, the verdict would have to
be for the defendant. We are unable to
ascertain the exact amount of the premiums. It depends entirely upon the age
of the insured. Assuming that he was a
middle-aged man, in our estimation the
premiums for three years would not exceed
$400, and probably not that much. It
does not appear that Smith intended paying for future premiums, had Jones not
died, so the whole amount of the premiums
was paid. According to the rule as laid
down in Ulrich v. Rleinoehl, 143 Pa. 238,
this is clearly a wagering policy. Also in
Shaffer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223, where the I
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policies were taken out bona fide, and to
secure a pre-existing indebtedness. There
was no indebtedness at the time Jones
took out this policy, and it seems as
though, in the words of Chief Justice
Paxson, in Grant v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618,
"care must be taken also that a debt shall
not be collusively contracted for the mere
'purposeof creating an insurable interest."
We are inclined to think that such was
the purpose in this case; nor can we see
how in any way this was a bona fide transaction.
In Gilbert v Moose, 104 Pa. 76, where
goose insured his life, making Jacobs the
beneficiary, who had no insurable interest,
and who subsequently assigned the policy
to Gilbert, who likewise had no insurable
interest, and having paid certain assessments was recognized by the company as
assignee, and upon the death of the insured collected the sum insured from the
company, it was held that the administrator of the insured was entitled to recover the insurance less assessments paid
by the assignee. We can decide this case
upon analogous principles. The elements
necessary to constitute it a valid policy are
wanting. Instead of Smith having an
interest in the life of Jones, the presumption in this case is inverted, and that he
had an interest in his death rather than in
his preservation, which no doubt in this
case resulted in murder. Clearly this
policy is a wager. We fail to discover
anything in this transaction to support
the plaintiff's claim.
Judgment is therefore entered in favor
of the defendant.
NOAH M. FRANTZ, J.
OPINION OP THE SUPREME COURT.

Although it is decided that one can validly take an insurance on his own life, and
make the money payable to another-1
Biddle, Insurance, 189-it is held in Pennsylvania that if the insurance is taken out
at the instance of the person named as
beneficiary, and with a view to speculation, it is so far void that the money, if
paid by the insurer, can be recovered by
the administrator of the insured-Kohr v.
Wolff, 16 W. N. C. 189; Meily v. Hershberger, 16 W. N. C. 186; and that the company, when sued, can successfully defend
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the action. U. B. Mutual Aid Society v.
McDonald, 122 Pa. 324.
Smith was related in no way to Jones.
Nor had he any other interest in the prolongation of Jones' life that would be the
basis of an insurance of it. Had Jones
been indebted to him, and had the debt
with the interest that would probably accumulate upon it during Jones' life, and
the premiums that would probably have
to be paid during that life in order to
maintain the policy, borne some proximate equality to the amount of the policy,
there would have been interest enough to
repel the suspicion of speculativeness in
the transaction. No such debt existed.
The amount of the first premium was lent
to Jones by Smith, in order that he might
take out the insurance. But, a debt cannot be created in order to sustain a policy
payable to the lenders. Besides, the ratio
of the policy, $5,000, to the first premium
is so great as to preclude any other inference than that the beneficiary was speculating in the life of Jones. Ulrich v.
Reinoehl, 143 Pa7. 238; Shaffer v. Spangler,
144 Pa. 223; Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall.
643; Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438; Cf. U.
B. Mutual Aid Society v. McDonald, 122
Pa. 324; McHale v. McDonnell, 175 Pa.
632; Grant v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618.
It does not appear that there was any
contract which bound Smith to pay the
other premiums. The subsequent payment of them can have no influence on the
validity of the policy, for debts arising after
the policy is issued cannot retroact upon it.
Had Smith lent the amount of the first
premium, and taken an assignment of the
policy as collateral security for its repayment, or even had he been named as beneficiary in the policy with the understanding thatr, having collected the money due
on it and repaid himself, he was to pay
the residue over to Jones' administrator,
the policy would doubtless have been
valid. Such does not appear to have been
the object or understanding of the parties.
It was their intention that Smith should
unconditionally own the policy.
The facts exhibited to the learned Court
of Common Pleas warranted it in holding,
as matter of law, that the insurance was a
speculation upon the life of Jones, and
that the company could not be compelled

to pay the money named in the policy to
the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.
HARRY HOLMES vs. JOHN TRESCOTT.
Ejectment-.enewal clawe.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Trescott leased a store in Carlisle to
Holmes fdr the period of five years, with
the right in Holmes to a renewal of the
lease for a second period of five years.
The first five years expired, and Holmes
made no demand for a renewal. Trescott
thereupon, in the absence of Holmes, who,
a month after the close of the five years,
had gone to Philadelphia to make purchase of goods, entered, and subsequently
refused to allow Holmes to take possession. Ejectment.
KOSTENBADER

for the plaintiff.

1. One has a right to elect whether he
will sue for damages or forspecific performance. if landlord refuses to grant renewal,
as per contract. Arno v. Alexander, 44
Mo. 25: Rutgers v. Hunter, 6 Johns. 215.
2. The undoing of lease implies renewal
for at least another term. Creighton v.
McKee, 7 Phila. 324.
PoINTs and CONRY for the defendant.
1. Landlord may enter in possession,
and may use reasonable force to secure
possession. 1 W. & S. 90; 121 Mass. 309.
2. Tenant turned out at expiration of
time cannot maintain ejectment. 135 Pa
418; 8 C. & P. 134; 2 Brews. 365.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In order to determine the rights of the
parties in this case, inquiry must be had
into the nature of the tenancy. Holmes
leased the store for five years, with the
right of renewal. He failed to exercise
that right. The mere silence of Trescott
in not demanding possession after the expiration of the lease is not an act in itself
which would imply a renewal. Chief
Justice Gibson, in Logan v. Herron, 8 S.
& R. 467, says: I'That the mere silence or
laches of the landlord in not demanding
possession at the expiration of the lease,
or at any time afterwards, cannot authorize the court to draw a conclusion of
acquiescence as a matter of legal inference." There must be some positive act
or acts on the part of the landlord indica-

THE FORUM.
tive of and from which a renewal may be
implied. Holmes is clearly a tenant at
sufferance, and as such a trespasser or
mere tort-feasor.
"Where a lease expires at a fixed date,
the tenant holding over is strictly a tenant at sufferance, though the lessor has
the option to treat him either as a trespasser or as a tenant from year to year."
Hemphill v. Flynn, 2 Pa. 144; Williams
v. Laden, 171 Pa. 169. The law is well
settled that a tenant at sufferance is a
mere trespasser, and as such the landlord
may oust or eject him at his pleasure and
desire. As a trespasser, Holmes has no
standing whatever in this court.
Judgment is therefore given for the defendant.
N. M. FRANTZ, P. J.
DISSENTING OPINION.

Where the lease is for any indefinite
period, notice is necessary to terminate
the demise. Where the lease is for a definite period, notice is not necessary, as the
tenant knows as well as the landlord when
his time expires, consequently the law
presumes he will carry out the terms of
the lease.
The question in this case is whether the
lease is for a definite or an indefinite period. If the lease is indefinite, then it
comes under the statute of Dec. 14, 1863.
If it i-i definite, then it does not come under the statute of 1863. If the lease in this
case is definite, then the lessee may be
considered by the landlord as either a tenant from year to year, or a tenant at sufferance immediately upon his remaining
over at the expiration of the lease. In
case he would be a tenant at sufferance,
why, he could not maintain an action of
ejectment against his landlord after he is
in possession, as in this case.
The case before us is similar to the case
of Quinn v. McCarty, 81 Pa. 475. In that
case the plaintiff had leased the property
in dispute to the defendant for the term
of one year, with the privilege of an extension for five years, provided the terms
of the lease should be complied with
throughout that period. It was said in
this case, and also in Brown's Appeal, 66
Pa. 155, that the Act of Dec. 14, 1863, was
designed to afford an ample and complete
system for the settlement of all controver-

sies of this kind. In the case before us
the lease was for a period of five years,
with the privilege of renewing it for
another period of five years. If the above
mentioned cases come within the statute,
then the case before us also falls within
the statute.
Now, then, having it within the statute,
we will see what effect it has upon it.
The statute declares that notice must be
given three months previous to the expiration of the lease. In 54 Pa. 86, Rich
v. Keyser, Judge Woodward says: "Both
the scope and tenor of the enactment, and
the grammatical construction of the sentence, demand a three months' notice
previous to the expiration of the term."
-In the case before us the lessor neglected
to serve notice. This, then, is sufficient
according to all cases that have been decided under the statute, to epable the lessee to remain in possession of the premises.
Had the lessor notified the lessee to vacate the premises, as he should hive done,
then the lessee could have taken advantage
of the right granted in the lease to renew
it for another period of five years. The
landlord's silence in regard to serving notice may have been taken by the lessee as
an assent to a renewal of the lease. Anyway, the Act seems to show that the
Legislature contemplated a re-possession
immediately at the end of the term. The
law implies an assent on the part of the
landlord to renew the lease by reason of
his silence, from the day he should have
served notice to quit to the time he entered upon the premises, one month after
the expiration of the term of the lease.
Had there been no stipulation in the
lease for right of renewal, then the lease
would have been definite, and the lessee
would have been obliged to vacate the
premises at the expiration of the term,
without having notice served upon him.
Such is the ruling in Williams v. Laden,
.171 Pa. 369. In that case the lease was for
a definite period, while in this case the
lease is for an indefinite period.

H. J.

SHELLENBERGER, J.
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however, that Evans overstepped the
bounds of the authority originally conAgency-Promissory note.
ferred upon him, it would seem that Maury
ratified his act. The question of implied
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
ratification, it must be granted, is comMaury, owning two horses which he demonly one which should be submitted to
sired to sell, told Evans of this fact, and
the jury. Schrock v. McKnight, 84 Pa.
asked him to sell them for him, if he got
26; Bank. v. Bank, 165 Pa. 500. But in
a chance. Evans hearing that William
the case at bar the acceptance of the note
Simpson wanted two horses, saw Simpson,
by the principal is proof absolute that he
who agreed to take them at $400 if three
gave his approval to his agent's act. "No
months' credit was given. Evan reported
rule of law is more firmly established than
the facts to Maury, who thanked him and the rule, that if one, with full knowledge
told him to make the sale, and take a note
of the facts, accepts the avails of an unat three months. Simpson drew the note authorized, treaty made in his behalf by
payable to Evans, and, an objection being
another, he thereby ratifies such treaty,
made to it, demurred to making another,
and is bound by its terms and stipulations
saying that the one made would answer
as fully as he would be had he negotiated
all purposes. Evans then accepted the
it himself." Huffcut on Agency, p. 33.
note, and, telling Maury all the facts,
See also Wheeler & Co. v. Aughey, 144 Pa.
handed the note to him, after endorsing
398; Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563; Strasit, in order to make it collectable or nego- ser v. Conklin, 54 Wis. 102. The request
tiable by Maury. Maury afterwards sold
of defendant that the question of ratificathe note for $100 to- one Hooper, who detion be submitted to the jury must be demanded and obtained payment from
nied.
Evans, on Simpson's failure to pay it. AsIl. That an agent is entitled to indemsumpsit by Evans to compel Maury to renity against the consequences of all acts
imburse him.
performed in the execution of his authority
ELDER and GRAUL for the plaintiff.
is a proposition based upon sound princi1. Agent is entitled to reimbursement
ple and abundant authority. D'Arcy v.
from principal for advances made and exLyle, 5 Binney (Pa.) 441; Huffcut on
penses incurred in effectuating purpose of
Agency, p. 80, and cases there cited. Its
his employment. Am. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law, 2nd Ed., 1117; Martland v. Martin,
application to the case before us is obvious.
86 Pa. 120; Griswold v. Gibbie, 126 Pa. 353.
Evans, in the execution of his authority,
2. Principal must promptly disavow
and strictly within its bounds, took a
acts transcendi ng authority, or remain liable. Buden v. Duenny, 14 S. & R. 27 ; note in his own name which was given
Wright v. Burbank, 64 Pa. 247; Mundorff for the price of Maury's horses. In order
v. Wickersham, 63 Pa. 87.
that Maury might negotiate or collect the
RHODES and BARR for the defendant.
note, it was necessary that Evans endorse
1. Plaintiff had no'authority to take
it, and he did so. Then, when the note
note payable to himself, and he must adfell due and was not paid by the maker, it
here strictly to instructions. Wilson v.
was necessary for Evans; as first endorser,
Wilson, 26 Pa. 393; Kroeger v. Pitcairn,
101 Pa. 311; Opie v. Senill, 6 W. & S. 264.
to tnke it up. This he did also, and being
2. Agent is responsible for all acts ununable to collect from the maker, he seeks
authorized by principal. McCullodk v.
reimbursement or indemnity for his loss
McKee, 16 Pa. 289.
from his principal. His claim is mani3. Ft is a question for the jury whether
the defendant ratified the action by taking
festly a just one, and we are of the opinion
the note. Bank v. Bank, 165 Pa. 500;
that he should be permitted to recover.
Schrock v. McKnight, 84 Pa. 26.
He was never a beneficial holder of the
note; he had no interest-in the consideraOPINION OF THE COURT.
tion for it; and his endorsement, as beI. Whether Evans was authorized to
tween him and Mfaury, did not involve a
take a note in his own name or not, does
not clearly appear. The direction of contract of suretyship, but was merely for
Maury was simply "to make the sale, and the purpose of passing the nominal ownership of the paper. It is true that Evans
take a note at three months." Assuming,
WM. EVANS vs. JOHN MIAURY.
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might have added the words "without recourse" to his endorsement, or made a
special agreement with Maury for his protection. But, under the circumstances,
we think an agreement of that nature is
implied. Abraham v. Mitchell, 112 Pa. 230.
Judgmentfor plaintiff.
JNO. BOWM AN vs. ADAM HARPER.
Mortgage-&i.f.a.-Sheriff' s sale.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On John Ames' land was a mortgage to
Wm. Jacobs for $2,500, and a second mortgage for $1,2 O to John Bowman. Ames
sold toHarper the land for 55,000, receiving S1,250 in cash, Harper undertaking to
pay the mortgages which were collateral
to judgments held by its mortgagees John
Bowman left for Australia, intending to
be absent for one year. Three months
after his depArture Harper caused Jacobs
to issue a sci.fa. Judgment was confessed
by Ames, and a sheriff's sale of the premises had, at which Harper became the
purchaser, paying $2,600. When Bowman
returned, finding that Harper denied that
he was under any duty to pay the $1,250,
he issued a sci.fa. upon the mortgage.
HOLCOMB and LAVENS for the plaintiff.
1. Person may sue on promise for his
benefit if consideration passes, even though
not made to him personally. Hoff's Appeal, 12 Harris 200; Townsend v. Long, 27
.F. Smith 143.
2. When realty is conveyed expressly
subject to mortgage recited in conveyance,
it becomes personal debt of lender. 88 Pa.
450; 90 Pa. 78; 160 Pa. 330.
MEARKLE and FRANTZ for the defendant.
1. A sale on first mortgage divests all
subsequent. 1 P. & L. Dig. 1585, Act of
1887.
2. Action should be in equity. Kennedy v. Bore, 166 Pa. 360; Merriman v.
fore, 90 Pa. 78.
3. Agreement to pay mortgages-was act
and agreement between parties to indemnify against loss. Moore's Appeal, 88 Pa.
450; Merriman v. More, 90 Pa. 78.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Harper bought the land of Ames for
$5,000, paying to Ames but $1,250, and
undertaking to pay the rest to the two
mortgagees, who held judgments to which
the mortgages were collateral. In the ab-

sence of Bowman, the second mortgagee,
Harper induced Jacobs, the first mortgagee, to foreclose his mortgage, and, at
the sheriff's sale, became the purchaser
for $2,600, but $100 more than Jacobs'
mortgage.
A sale on a first lien ordinarily divests
all later liens, and the Bowman mortgage
would normally be extinguished by the
sale on the Jacobs mortgage. If, under
the existing circumstances, it is extinguished, the consequence will be that
Ames will be liable on the judgment
against him to Bowman, in spite of Harper's undertaking to discharge the debt, or
Harper,if liable at all, will be liable on some
quasi-contract. To discharge him would
be grossly inequitable. Nor is any advantage to be derived from resorting to a
quasi-contract. If the only remedy is on
such feigned contract, time must elapse
before t judgment can be recovered upon
it. In the interval, it would be possible
for Harper to convey away the land, and
so deprive Ames of the security which his
contract contemplated. We are of opinion,
therefore, that in contriving to procure a
discharge of the second mortgage without
paying it, Harper was endeavoring to procure a result which is inconsistent with his
duty towards Ames.
But we think Harper owed a duty to
Bowman, not to resort to any trick or contrivance to procure a divestiture of the
Bowman judgment. His duty was to pay
it, not to evade it. He was wanting in
that good faith which the law imposes
upon him the duty to practice. Kennedy
v. Borie, 166 Pa. 360; DuPlaine's Appeal,
185 Pa. 332. The only effectual method of
circumventing the attempted evasion is to
hold the second mortgage undivested. It
logically follows that .a scire facias may
be maintained upon it. Ashmead v.
McArthur, 67 Pa. 326; Jermon v. Lyon,
81 Pa. 107.
Your verdict, therefore, gentlemen of
the jury, will be for the plaintiff forSl,250,
with interest.
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SARAH RUDOLPH vs. SAMUEL
SMOCK.
Resulting trust.
STATE-MENT OF THE CASE.

Sarah Rudolph, employing her husband
to obtain a tract of land for her, gave him
$4,000 with which to make payment. The
payment was made, and without her
knowledge the deed was made to John
Rudolph, the husband, and put on record.
Seven years afterwards, a creditor of John
Rudolph obtained a judgmenc against him
and caused a sheriff's sale of the land,
Smock becoming the purchaser. John and
Sarah Rudolph had been in possession of
the farm from the time of its purchase.
During a temporary absence from the
county of the Rudolphs, Smock took possession. Ejectment.
COBLENTZ and GEny for the plaintiff.
If a wife furnishes the purchase money
with which the husband buys land and
takes the deed in his own name without
her knowledge, there will be a resulting
trust in favor of the wife.-Kline'sAppeal,
39 E a. 463; Fillmans v. Davies, 31 Pa. 429;
Peifer v. Lytle, 38 Pa. 886; Rupp's Appeal,
100 Pa. 531; Heath v. Slocum, 115 Pa. 549.
The five year statute of limitation did not
run against the wife for she was in possession of the land.-Clark v. Trindle, 52
Pa. 492; Williard v. Williard, 56 Pa. 119;
Smith v. Tome, 68 Pa. 158.
BASHOmtE and CLIPPINGER for the defendant.
Smock must have had notice before a resuiting trust is established.-Fillman v.
Divers, 31 Pa. 429; Miller v. Baker, 160 Pa.
172; Miller v. Baker, 166 Pa. 414; Mulley v.
Shoemaker, 180 Pa. 585; Olinger v. Shultz,
183 Pa. 469. The defendant was a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice.Act of April 22, 1856, 1 P. & L. 532, Sec. 6.
Christy v. Sill, 95 Pa. .80; Rupp's Appeal,
100 Pa. 531; Miller v. Baker, 160 Pa. 172.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

When the deed was made to John Ru
dolph, he became a trustee of the land for
his wife, who furnished him the purchase
money, and for whom he obtained the
conveyance. How his name came to be
inserted as grantee in the deed does not
appear, nor is it material. It might have
been by the scrivener's or the grantor's
mistake. It might have been by the dixection of Rudolph himself, and his design
might have been, as respects his wife, in-

nocent and honorable, or otherwise. The
bare fact that he undertook, with his wife's
money, to buy the land for her, affects his
legal title with a resulting trust for her.Lloyd v. Woods, 176 Pa. 63.
A resulting trust can be asserted not only
against the trustee, but also against ajudgment creditor of the trustee.--Sill v. Swackhammer, 103 Pa. 7; Davey v. Puffell, 162
Pa. 443; Miller v. Baker, 166 Pa.414. When,
then, seven years after the conveyance to
Rudolph, the judgment was recovered
against him. the trust in favor of his wife
continued to be available to her, as fully as
before.
It is, however, a well established doctrine
that such a trust ceases to be assertable
when the legal title has passed for value
to one who had no notice of it. On the
judgment against Rudolph there has been
a sheriff's sale, at which Samuel Smock
became the purchaser. Did he have notice
of the equitable title of Sarah Rudolph?
Record title of Mrs. Rudolph's interest
Smock had not. There was no deed to
her. No such deed could therefore be recorded. The deed that was recorded indicated thatthe land was her husband's. Of
actual notice of Mrs. Rudolph's interest at
the sheriff's sale, there is no suggestion in
the evidence. No constructive notice, i.e.,
no facts which might be treated as equivalents of notice, is revealed, other than the
possession of Mrs. Rudolph, before, at, and
after the sheriff's sale. Had she been in
sole possession, there can be no question
that it would have been incumbent on
Smock, before purchasing the land, either
to inquire of heras to the title under which
she claimed, or to submit to it, whatever
it might be, if otherwise valid.-Jaques v.
Weeks, 7 W. 276; Hottenstein v. Lercb,
104 Pa. 454; Anderson v. Brinser, 129 Pa.
376; Rowe v. Ream, 105 Pa. 543.
Had the deed on record been to another
than Mr. Rudolph, it is also certain
that Mrs. Rudolph's possession, though
in conjunction with
her husband,
would have been
constructive
notice to Smock of her equitable title.
Sill v. Swackhammer, 103 Pa. 7; Jamison
v. Dimock, 95 Pa. 52; Brown v. Carey,.149
Pa. "134. The precise question we are to
determine is, whether, the recorded deed
being to John Rudolph, and he, with his

THE IFORUM
wife, being in apparent possession, there
was any duty upon Smock to inquire of
him or of her as to the right under which
they had the possession.
Why should the fact that the recorded
deed was to John Rudolph preclude him
from defending on some other title than
grantee, if he had any? The deed, it is
true, would account for his possession, and
there are cases which intimate that when
this is so the purchaser need suspect no
other title than the deed.-Lance v. Gorman, 136 Pa 200: Plumer v.Robertson, 6 S.
& R. 179; Woods v. Farmere, 7 W. 382; Dickinson v. Beyer, 87 Pa. 274. On the other
hand, it is held that if one is in possession
under a lease, his possession is constructive
notice of any other title he may have, even
to a purchaser who was aware of the lease
and assumed that it was the full explanation of the possession, Anderson v. Brinser,
129 Pa. 376, repudiating a dictum to the
contrary in Leach v. Ansbacher, 55 Pa. 85;
Cf. also Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. 249,
cited in Hottenstein v. Lerch, 104 Pa. 454.
It may be, though this is doubtful, that as
John Rudolph has put a deed to himself in
fee simple on record, Smock was under no
duty to suspect that he was in possession,
not as grantee, but by the permission of his
wife, and under her right.
But is Mrs. Rudolph precluded from insisting that she being in possession, it was
Smock's duty to inquire after any title
which she had? There are dicta to the
effect that the possession of the wife along
with her husband is notice of her title only
when there is no deed to the husband inconsistent with that title. Thus McCullom
J. says,- in Brown v. Carey, 149 Pa. 134,
"The possession of Mrs. Carey was consistent with her title [by aresulting trust] and
sufficient in the absence of a recorded title
in her husband inconsistent with it, to put
a purchaser on inquiry."
If it appeared that Sarah Rudolph knew
that the conveyance had been to her husband and nevertheless caused the deed to
be recorded, or assented to its being recorded, it might be proper to hold her
no less bound by the implied representation
as to the explanation of her possession than
lie would be as to the explanation of his.
But it is distinctly shown that she had not
this knowledge, nor caused the recording

of the deed. Nor are we able to adopt the
rule that she shall be estopped, by reason
of the lapse of six years since the deed was
made, to deny her knowledge and causation. Wives may own lands, as well as
husbands, and they may be in possession
of these lands with their husbands. It is
no hardship to require intending purchasers to suspect in any case that the wife may
be the owner, and therefore to make inquiry of her or to take the risk. "In this
State since 1848," observes Green, J.,
"married women are the owners in their
own right of real estate held by them before marriage or acquired by gift or purchase after marriage, and it is not infrequent that husbands live with their wives
upon the land of the latter."
Of these
facts it is not too much to expectpurchasers
to have knowledge, and to require them,
before venturing on the purchase, to investigate upon the premises the possible and
not very improbable title of the wife. It
was not necessary for Smock to buy this
land and buying it, we think he must be
held to have taken the risk of the ownership of the person as whose he bought it.
Cf. Jackson v. McFadden, 4 W. N. C. 539.
Over five years have elapsed since the
resulting trust came into existence by the
conveyance to John Rudolph. It is well
settled, however, that the act of April 22,
1856 does not apply, so long as the cestui
que trustis in possession.-Miller v. Baker,
160 Pa. 172; 166 Pa. 414; Clinger v. Shultz,
183 Pa. 469; Light v. Zeller, 144 Pa. 582.
Your verdict, therefore, gentlemen of
the jury, if you find the facts to be as assumed in our previous remarks to you,
should be for the plaintiff.
JOHN RUSKIN vs. HERBERT
SPENCER.
Possessionas between co-tenants-Powero
one to lease.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Spencer and Williams as tenants in
common owned a tract of oil land. Williams in Spencer's absence and without his
knowledge, made a lease of the land for
fifteen years to Ruskin, reserving a royalty
of twenty-five cents per barrel on all of the
oil taken out. Ruskin took possession an d
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began and continued for five years the
business of obtaining oil-paying in the
meantime the royalty amounting to $3,000
to Williams. Spencer then coming to the
neighborhood and finding Ruskin temporarily absent took possession of the land,
and by a show of force, prevented Ruskin's
re-entering on it. The operations were
therefore suspended byRuskin and he was
deprived of his machinery and improvements worth $2,000.
Trespass for damages.
HOLCOMB and HEIST for the plaintiff.
One co-tenant in common, unless empowered by the other co-tenant, cannot
execute a lease which will be binding on
his fellow co-tenant. McKinley v. Peters,
Ill Pa. 283; Painter v. Cole, 120 Mass. 162.
Such a lease is binding only on the party
executing it. McKinley v. Peters, 111 Pa.
283; Vandyke's Appeal, 57 Pa. 9. As
against the co-tenant it is voidable, McKinley v. Peters, supra; Graves v. Hodges,
55 Pa. 516. Ruskin by the lease became a
co-tenant with Spencer, and he, therefore,
has a right of ejectment against Spencer
for one-half the profits. McGee v. Ash, 7
Pa. 397; Filbert v. Hoff, 42 Pa. 97; Bennett
v. Bullock, 35 Pa. 364; Critchfield v. Humbert, 39 Pa.427; Trauger v.Sassaman, 14 Pa.
514. By the same reasoning Ruskin can
recover either as his own property or regarded as fixtures.
KENNEDY and FRANK for defendant.
One tenant in common cannot bind the
land by lease. McKinleyv. Peters, 111 Pa.
283; Painter v. Cole, 120 Mass. 152 ; Vandyke's Appeal, 57 Pa. 9. Therefore, Ruskin was a trespasser arid Spencer had a
right to eject him from the land.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The ]essee of one tenant in common is
lawfully in possession of the whole tract
demised, for the lessor's possession is
per mie et per tout: Baker v. Lewis, 150
Pa. 251 ; such lessee on entry has the same
rights in relation to the other co-tenants
as the lessor before the demise, even
though such lease was made against the
will and without the authority of the other
co-tenants: Keay v. Goodwin, 16 Mass. 1;
Lessee of Simpson v. Ammons, 1 Binn.
175. Says Agnew J., in Hayden v. Patterson, 51 Pa. 261, "But there is nothing
to prevent a tenant in common in possession from letting out his share of the common property and receiving rent for it."
We think that the case of McGill v. Ash,
7 Pa. 397, rules the case at bar. McGill
had rented the locgzs in quo to Mrs. Smith

for a tavern, one-fifth of which premises
had been recovered in ejectment by Ash
who had been putinto possession as a tenant in common by the sheriff. Mrs. Smith
at the instigation of McGill threw out Ash
and his goods. The court held, "that a
tenant in common may maintain trespass
(against his co-tenant) for an injury done
to his possession, because that possession
is not confined to any particular part of
the premises but is commensurate with
the whole in relation to which he has the
right to an exclusive possession except as
against his co-tenant, and the measure of
damages will be regulated by the extent of
his interest." The gist of the action was
the dispossession of the plaintiff; throwing
out him and his goods was wrong only in
the light of his right to the possession of
the locus in quo. Says Thayer, P. J.. in
Norris v. Gould, 15 W. N. C. 187, "But it
is still the law that one tenant in cominon
can sustain trespass against his co-tenant
only in case of an unequivocal ouster from
his right of entry and possession."
Says Harrison, J., in Winterburn v.
Chambers, 91 Cal. 170, "An ouster of one
co-tenant by another is produced by acts
of the same character as will produce any
other ouster. In either case it is the
wrongful dispossession or exclusion of a
party from real property who is entitled to
the possession. In each case the same
kind of possession is required and must be
taken and held with the same hostile intent. * * * In the case of the co-tenant,
however, the intent with which the possession is taken is not manifested by the
mere fact of possession, but must be established either by actual notice or by acts or
declarations so open and notorious, and of
such u nature that it may readily be presumed that the co-tenant out of possession
is informed thereby of the hostile intent
with which the possession is held. It is
the intent.which determines the character
of the possession; but it is essential that
this intent be in some mode 3ither by actual or presumptive notice, directly or indirectly communicated to the other cotenant. This intent is not the secret purpose of the occupant but is the purpose
which the acts themselves manifest, and
the acts done must be manifested to the
person against whom the ouster is di-
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rected." The ouster must be proved by
decisive acts of a hostile character: Watson v. Gregg, 10 Watts 289. In Trauger
v. Sassaman, 14 Pa. 514, the defendants
built a wall which effectually excluded the
co-tenants from placing their carriages or
hitching their horses in the locus in quo;
the court held thatsuch act constituted an
ouster for which trespass may be maintained. There may be an ouster of a portion of the land held in common : Bennett
v. Clemence, 6 Alleg 10; Carpenter v.
Webster, 27 Cal. 524. "No real force, as a
turning out by the shoulders is necessary.
If upon demand by the co-tenant the
other denies his right and continues in
possession such possession is adverse and
an ouster enough;" Doe v. Prosser, 1
Cowp. 217 ; Carpenter v. Webster, 27 Cal.
524; Gordon v. Pearson, I Mass. 328. No
attempt need be made to re-enter in the
face of threats: People v. Rickert, 8 Cow.
232. In the case at bar the defendant
"prevented" the plaintiff from re-entering;
such prevention accompanied with "a
show of force" clearly shows a hostile intent, and constitutes an actual ouster.
What shall be the measure of damages?
In Bare v. Hoffman, 79 Pa. 71, the defendant diverted by a large pipe the water
of a water course from the premises of the
plaintiff. The court held that it was not
to be presumed that such tort would continue through all coming time; that for
any continued obstruction of the right the
plaintiff could sustain successive actions;
in each case he could recover the damages
he had sustained subsequently to the last
preceding action; that the damages recoverable are limited to those already suffered at the commencement of the suit.
See also: Uline v. Railroad Co., 101 N. Y.
98. The plaintiff should recover a fair
rental value of the oil land to the extent of
his interest (presumably half), plus a fair
rental value of the machinery (all of which
is his own) for the whole time he has been
deprived of the possession. Has this been
a dayortenyears? We cannot permit the
jury to guess :Irwin v. Nolde, ]64 Pa. 205.
The loss is pecuniary and can be measured;
theie is no evidence to show the extent of
time the plaintiff has been deprived of the
possession; nominal damages only can be
allowed: Leeds v. Metropolitan Gas Light

Co., 90 N. Y. 26; McHugh v. Schlosser,
159 Pa. 480.
The jury are therefore directed to find a
verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of six cents and costs.
WARREN L. SHIPMAN, J.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

That Williams in the absence of some
special authority had no power to bind
Spencer by the agreement to lease their
land to the plaintiff is apparent; McKinley v. Peters, 111 Pa. 283.
But on the other hand, being in possession, he clearly had the right to lease his
own share of the common property. Hayden v. Patterson, 51 Pa. 261, and notwithstanding the fact that Williams had no authority to bind Spencer we do not think
the lease is void, but that it is valid as
against Williams, and conveyed his interest to Ruskin, see Vandyke's Appeal,
57 Pa. 9; Grove v. Hodges, 55 Pa. 504. As
the lease conveyed Williams' interest, and
he had the right to possession, it is self
evident that his lessee acquired the same
right. Ruskin was therefore lawfully in
possession of the whole land.
The case of McKinley v. Peters, supra,
relied on by counsel for the defendant, is to
be distinguished from this one in important
particulars. In that case the action was in
assumpsit and against both co-tenants, and
while it clearly supports the proposition
that both co-tenants cannot be held when
the co-tenant who neither ratified or authorized the making of the lease enters
and takes possession of the land, yet we
are of the opinion that had the action been
in trespass and only against the co-tenant
who made the entry the plaintiff would
have been entitled to recover. The case
of Baker v. Lewis, ]50 Pa. 251, is authority
for the statement that the defendant committed a trespass by taking possession of
the land, and preventing the plaintiff
from re-entering, and also that Spencer's
remedy is an action for mesne profits or
for the use and occupation of the land.
We are of the opinion that that case
rules this one and on the authority of it
we enter judgment for the plaintiff in the
sum of $2,000, or the amount of damage
caused by the defendant's enteringund retaining the possession of the land.
Judgment for plaintiff.
W. ALFRED VALENTINE, J.
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JOHN ADAMS vs. FARMER'S BANK.
Duty of collecting bank.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

itory is not a matter to be inquired into in
the present case.
The plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover.
NATHAN ORRIS vs. WM. JAMES.

Adams received a check drawn by John
Coe on the Merchants' Bank for $1000, and
endorsed it to the Farmers' Bank for collection. The Farmers' Bank sent it to the
Merchants' and surrendered it, receiving
the check of the cashier of the latter bank
in payment.
The Merchants' Bank instautly charged the check against Coe's
account. The next day it failed, closing
its doors. The Farmers' Bank then charging the amount of the check against the
deposit account of Adams, which it had
previously credited with the same amount,
Adams brings this assumpsit.

On Jan. 1, 1900, Wim. James gave to
Nathan Oris a check forS1,000 payable at
the Carlisle Bank in satisfaction of a debt
due by him for lumber. He had in the
bank $,100.
On Jan. 5, Orris went to the
bank to procure the money, but one hour
before it had closed its doors. The bank
is insolvent and depositors will lose everything. Orris now sues on the bill for
lumber amounting to $1,000.

O'KEEFE and RYAN for the plaintiff.
By accepting anything else than cash,
tihe defendant became liable. - 3 Am. &
Eng. Ency. (2nd Ed.) p. 804; Hazlett v.
Comm. Natl. Bank, 1132 Pa. 118; Pitts.
Fifth Natl. v. Ashworth, 123 Pa. 212; Merchants' Natl. Bank v. Goodman. 109 Pa.
422; McCulloch v. McKee, 16 Pa. 289.
SEBRING and SLOAN for the defendant.
When a bank credits a depositor with a
check left for collection, and the check is
found to be worthless, the amount may be
charged back.-Rapp v. Natl. Bank of
Phila., 136 Pa. 426. Money paid on a
worthless check can be recovered.-,89 N.
Y. 419; Clews v. Bank of Natl. Banking
Asso., 59 N. Y. 67.

LAUER and BRENNAN for the plaintiff.
1. A check does not discharge a debt until it has been paid. McIntyre v. Kennedy. Childs & Co., 29 Pa. 448; Hart v.
Ballas. 15 S. &. R. 162; Weakley v. Bell,
9 Watts. 273.; Hays v. McClury, 4 Watts.
452.
ERL ES and WANNER for the defendant.
1. The holder of a check, in order to
charge the drawer in case of a dishonor,
must present the check for paymentwithin
a reasonable time. If drawer resides in
the town where the bank is located fortyeight hours is the extent of such reasonabletime. National Bank v. Weil, 141 Pa.
457; Fegley v. McDonald, 89 Pa. 128; Case
v. Morris, 31 Pa. ]00.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The Farmers' Bank received the check
of Coe from Adams, the plaintiff, and credited theaccount of thelatter with thesame,
It presented this check to the bank oi
which it was drawn and took the cashier's
check of the latter instead of the cash for
the same. The Farmers' Bank was bound
to return to Adams the money or the check.
It did neither, but saw fit to give credit to
the drawee by accepting its obligation for
the same.
"As between the defendant and the depositor this amounted to payment."-5
Nat]. Bk. v. Ashworth, 123 Pa. 319.
That Coe had a sufficient balance to his
credit to pay the check is not contended
for. It was charged to his account when
presented without a question. Besides,
the dealings between him and his depos-

James' check was given to Orris in satisfaction of 'a 'debt for lumber. Had it,
however, on due presentment to the bank
not been paid, then Orris would have had
a right to payment in s6me other mode.
He received the check on Jan. 1, 1900. On
Jan. 5, he went to the bank to procure the
money and found that one hour before it
had closed its doors. Had he gone on the
2nd, 3rd or 4th of January, he would have
been paid.
When James gave the check it was his
duty to leave its amount on deposit in the
bank. His hands were thus tied with respect to withdrawing it. It was Orris's
duty* to avoid unnecessary delay in presenting the check. The delay of four days
is primafacie unreasonable, and has not
been explained. It would be unjust to

Payment- Check.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
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transfer the resulting loss from Orria to
James. This result can be avoided, only
by holding the check under the circumstances, a payment of the debt. National
Bank v. Weil, 141 Pa. 457.
On the case stated, judgment for the defendant.
JONES' ESTATE.
Seal-Consideration-Evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Onl August 11, 1894, Adam Coover borrowed $1,000 from John Stope, giving the
latter his bond.
There were two printed sealson the bond,
Coover's name being placed on a line midway between the two.
The bond not being paid, Stope agreed
with Coover not to sue if he would get security, and for this purpose gave him the
bond (taking a receipt for it).
Coover asked Jones to become security,
and Jones put his name on the bond below
that of Coover and slightly below the extension of the lower line of the lower seal.
There was no evidence as to Jones' intention to adopt this seal.
January, 1897, Jones died, and Stope not
being paid, presented his bond at the distribution of the estate of Jones.
COBLENTZ and PIPER for the plaintiff.
1. From the facts it is to be presumed
that Jones adopted the seal as his own.Bowman v. Robb, 6 Pa. 302; Hess' Est.,
150 Pa. 346.
2. Consideration is implied from the seal.
Grubb v. Willis, 11 S. & R. 187. Forbearance to sue is a sufficient consideration.Carmen v. Noble, 9 Pa. 366; Bailey v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 602.
SLOAN and TAYLOR. W., for the defendant.
. A seal will not be presumed to have
been adopted unless there is clear evidence.
Bowman v. Robb, 6 Pa. 302; Rhoades v.
Trempleton, 4 Forum, 106.
2. There was no consideration to support
Jones' promise to pay.-Hess' Est., 150 Pa.
346; Rhoads v. Templeton, 4 Forum, 106.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Objection was made before the auditor
to the claim of John Stope against this
estate, on the ground that the engagement
of Jones as surety on Coover's bond is without consideration and is not under seal.

We think that the objection is not supported by the evidence. In the first place,
itappears that there were two printed seals
upon the instrument; that Coover signed
on a line midway between the two, and
that Jones signed slightly below the extension of the lower line of the second seal.
Whether Jones intended to adopt the second printed seal is a question of fact, and
we are unable to say that the auditor had
no right to infer that it was his intention
so to do. Indeed, we believe the evidence
ample to justify such a conclusion. In
Bowman v. Robb, 6 Pa. 302, where there
was the written obligation of two parties,
concluding with the words "Witness our
hands and seals," but only one seal, which
was affixed to the name of the party first
signing, the court held that the obligation
on its face furnished intrinsic evidence for
the jury that the party last signing it had
adopted the seal as it stood upon the paper.
The evidence of adoption seems ,to be at
least as strong in the case at bar as in the
easejustmentioned. It is true that in this
case the words "witness our hands and
seals" are not contained in the instrument,
but on the other hand there are two seals
here while in Bowman v. Robb there was
but one. The fact that the signatures were
slightly below the respective seals, we regard as of little moment.
The case of Hess' Estate, 150 Pa. 346, may
readily be distinguished. Thereitappeared
that there were two signatures, only one
seal, and a reference in the body of the
bond to only one seal. From such facts,
the inference was clear that one of the signatures was not under seal, and the auditor so found.
The engagement of Jones being under
seal, the claim is enforceable, though without actual consideration. If it were to be
considered, however, that Jones did not
adopt the printed seal, we are of the opinion that the agreement of Stope with
Coover, to forbear from bringing suit upon
the bond, was a consideration sufficient.to
support Jones' engagement. Mere forbearance, it has been held, is not a consideration for such an engagement, but an agreement to forbear, like a definite extension
of time, is unquestionably sufficient.-McNaught v. MeClaughey, 42 N. Y. 24; Mecorney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 85.
The decree confirming the report of the
auditor is affirmed.
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PHILIP AMES vs. AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY.
Insurance Policy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On Sept. 3, 1899, Ames took outa policy
on his house in Meehanicsburg, for $3,500.
The application and policy described the
house as a tenement now in the occupancy
of James Styles. Styles' lease expired
Feb. 11, 1900, when he moved away and
the house remained without a tenant until
on Feb. 27th it was burned down by an
incendiary.
The policy contained the
stipulation that."if the premises shall be
applied to-any other use than the present
without the consent of the company expressed in writing this policy shall become
void." It also 9tated that, "if by any
change of the use of the building the risk
of fire shall be increased, this policy shall
be void unless the previous written consent of the company shall have been procured therefor." The 6ompany had not
been notified of the vacancy of the house.
Ames had made no serious effbrt to procure a tenant after Styles' removal. Plaintiff non suited-motion to take off.
HOLcouiB and RO1HERMIEL for the
plaintiff.
1. Insurance policies are interpreted
strictly, and the presenit policy contains
no stipulation against non-occupancy.
Gaxhwell v. Ins. &o., 12 Cush. 167 ; Land
v. Ins. Co., 2 Gray 222; Hall v. Ins. V'o., 6
Gray 187.
LAVENS and JOHNSTON for the defendant.
1. Non-occupancy was, in the terms of
the policy, such "change of the use of the
building" as to increaso risk of fire. A. &
E. Enc., Vol. 7, 1032 ; Cornish v. Ins. Co.,
51 N. Y. 318; Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co., 1 Gray
426.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant Company insured the
house of the plaintiff. It was stipulated
in the policy that "if the premises shall be
applied to any other use than the present
without the consent of the Company expressed in writing, this policy shall become
void," and also that, "if by any change
of the use of the building the risk of fire
slall be increased, this policy shall be void
unless the previous written consent of the
Company shall have been procured therefor."

It does not appear that the policy was to
become void by reason of non-occupancy.
The vacancy for the period of eighteen
days caused by the removal of the tenant
cannot be held to be the application of the
premises "to any other use" in the sense in
which that tern' was used in the policy.
It must be interpreted that a reasonable
and ordinary use of the property insured
was intended, having regard to its nature
and the circumstances likely to occur. A
vacancy wis one of these and must have
been in contemplation. Nor can it be held
as a matter of law that the risk was thereby increased.
"The question whether the change of
circumstances in the situation, use
or condition of the party increases the risk is
surely one of fact for the jury." Wood on
Fire Insurance, 4:39.
"Vacancyor non-tenincyof thepremises
will not of itself be held to constitute a
material increase of risk." A. &E. Ency.
of Law, vol. 7, page 1036; Luce v. Dorchester Mutual Ins. Co., 10.iMass. 397.
In Gamwll v. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 167,
the property was vacated for fifty-three
days, yet the court held it was for the jury
to determine if there had been any material
increase in the risk.
In O'Neill v. Ins. Co., 3 Comstock 122,
the premises were described in the policy
as "occupied by a certain individual, as a
private residence," yet it was there held
"that this did not amount to a warranty
of the continuance of theoccupation during
the risk, and therefore the insurers were
liable, although before loss the occupant
had removed and left the premises vacant. "
The policy in the present case did not
provide that it should become void in case
of non-occupancy of the house. The case
should therefore have been submitted to
the jury and the nonsuit is taken off.
PETER HOLMES vs. PA. R. R. CO.
Negligence-ailroadcrossings.
STATEMENT OF T11E CASE.
Holmes was driving his team along the
Dublrc highway and in attempting to cross
the tracks of the defendant company was
injured by being run into by a train on defendant's road. The train was going at
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the rate of 60 miles an hour. The track
near the crossing was so curved that approaching trains could not be seen. Holmes
stopped, looked and listened, but could see
or hear nothing of the approaching train.
A bell was rung which could be heard 70
yards. A whistle could have been heard
eight times that distanc,. The place at
crossing is rural, only three houses in onethird of a mile in either direction. Court
non-suited the plaintiff on the ground of
no negligence. This is a motion to take
off the non-suit.
JOHNSTON and LAVENS for the plaintiff.
1. The question of negligence must go
to the jury.-7 P. F. S. 174.
2. The highest degree of care is required
at dangerous crossings, Ellis v. R. R., 138
Pa. 519; and the ringing of the bell in the
case of train running.t a high speed is not
a proper substitute for a steam whistle.Longnecker v. R. R., 105 Pa. 328.
HEIST and KERN for the defendant.
1. There is no evidence of negligence
and the court was not in error in non-suiting, for it is not negligence (a) torun trains
at high speed in rural districts.- Childs v.
R. R., 150 Pa. 73; R. R. v. Ritchie, 102 Pa.
425. (b) Proper warning is required on
approaching crossings, and ringing the
bell is proper warning.--R. R. v. Hogan,
47 Pa. 244; R. R. N. Stinger, 78 Pa. 219; R.
R. v. Killips, 88 Pa. 405; Childs v. R. R.,
150 Pa. 73.

AMOS KING vs. JACOB KOENIG.
Collateralsecurity-Negligence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Koenig being indebted on book account
to King in S237.12, assigned to King a note
for S2.50 payable to him, Koenig, by one
This note fell due
Adam Farnham.
twenty days after it was assigned. The
assignment did not mention that it was as
collateral security, but in form was absolute. When the note became due, King
informed Farnham that lie held it and denmanded payment. Farnham paid $50 on
account and agreed that he would wait
three months for the balance, for SlO paid
him in addition to the $50, and at the same
time. At the expiration of the three
months, the note not being paid, and Farnham having absconded, deeply insolvent,
King demanded payment from Koenig,
who refused. This assumpsit was then
brought.
DRUMHELLER and DAvis for the plain-

tiff.
1. The assignment of the note was as
collateral security and not as payment.
Jones v. Johnson, 3 W. & S. 276; Leas v.
James, 10 S. & R. 314; Ely v. Hoopes, 1
Penny. 175 ; Hunter v. Moore, 98 Penn. 15;
Seltzer v. Coleman, 32 Penn. 494.
2. The fact that no mention was made
OPINION OF THE COURT.
in the assignment as to its being collateral
That the crossing on which the plaintiff security is not conclusive. Bolles on Neg.
Instruments, 184.
was injured was most dangerous, as well
3. The endorsee did not release the enas the fact that the train was running ata
dorser from liability by agreeing to extend
very high rate of speed was shown on the
the time of payment by maker for a consideration. Hagey v. Hill, 75 Penn. 108.
trial. On the other hand it was located in
MOORE and BORYER for the defendant.
the open country. While the rate of speed
1. The holder of a note as collateral sewas not therefore negligence on the part
curity is bound to employ reasonable diliof the Railroad C(ompanyperse,yeta high
gence in its collection and a conversion of
degree of care to prevent accidents was
it into a less security is such misuse as
incumbent upon it, owing to the location.
makes him responsible to original debtor.
Muirhead v. Kirkpatrick, 21 Pa. 237;
Ellis v. R. R. Co., 138 Pa. 519; P. W. & B.
Hanna v. Holton, 78 Pa. 334; Bast v.
R. R. Co. v. Stinger, 78 Pa. 219. "What
Bank, 101 U. S. 93; Lyon v. Huntingdon
is reasonable and proper warning is deBank, 12 S. & R. 61.
pendent upon the circumstances of the
case."-Childs v. R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 73.
"Under the circumstances, it was the
duty of the Court to submit to thejury the
question whether the defendant had been
guilty of negligence or not."-P. & R. Co.
v. Killips, 88 Pa. 405; Childs v. R. R. Co.,
150 Pa. 73.
There was therefore error in entering a
non-suit and the motion to take off the
same must be allowed.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
The note which Koenig, the defendant,
assigned to King being the note of a third
party for a different sum than the amount
due the plaintiff from the defendant, and

for a precedent debt, the presumption is
that it was intended as collateral security
-as conditional payment, that is, to be a
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satisfaction if and when paid-and not as
an immediate and absolute discharge.McIntyre v. Kennedy, Childs & Co., 29 Pa.
45f-53; Jones v. Johnson, 3 W. & S. 276;
Eby v. Hoopes, 1 Penny. 175, and the defendant having produced no evidence
which would warrant you in finding that
the parties had a contrary intention, that
presumption must prevail, hence the assignment of the note to the plaintiff did
not extinguish the defendant's liability on
the book account.
But it has been decided that when collaterals are placed in the hands of the creditor, and are not collected because of lack
of due diligence on the creditor's part, that
the debt will be regarded as extinguished.
Bank of U. S. v. Peabody, 20 Pa. 454; Sellers & Nicholas v. Jones, 22 Pa. 423; Kilpatrick v. B. & L. Association, 119 Pa. 30;
Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. 233; Hanna V.
Holton, 78 Pa. 334, and this the defendant
contends is what has happened in this case;
that the plaintiff by agreeing with Farnham that he would wait an extra 3 months
for the payment of the remainder of the
money did not use the proper degree of
care. This, gentlemen, is a question for
you. If you determine that the plaintiff
did use reasonable care in entering into this
agreement with Farnham, your verdict
should be for him. If, on the other hand,
you decide that he did not use the same
degree of care which a reasonably prudent
man would have used under like circumstances, your verdict should be for the defendant.
The plaintiff does not appear to demand
interest. We have not been furnished with
dates and are therefore unable to compute
it, but in case you should find for the
plaintiff, the amount of your verdict should
be $187.12 or the amount of the book account less the $50 paid by Farnham to the
plaintiff.
VALENTINE, J.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
Was the transfer of the note by Koenig
to King to be an absolute payment of the
debt or was it given merely as collateral
security? To render the assignment a
complete satisfaction there must be a
specific intention of the parties to so consider it and in the absence of this intention
the presumption of the law is, that the as-

signment was collateral security: and it is
incumbent on the defendant to overcome
this.
And no intention that it was to be absolute payment can be drawn from the writing itself, simply because it did not expressly state that it was collateral, or because it was absolute in form. Eby v.
Hoopes, 1 Penny. 175. Again the assigned
note was for a greater amount than the
debt owed ; it is held that a higher security
will be presumed to be collateral ; see Jones
v. Johnson, 3 W. & S. 278.
"The mere acceptance from a debtor of
the note of a third person in the case of an
antecedent indebtedness is not a payment,
and in the absence of a special agreement
it must be considered as collateral security,
and such acceptance is no bar to recovery
from defendant for the original debt.
The debtor continues liable in the event of
a failure of payment of the note thus given
or transferred." This law is explicitly
stated in Hunter v. Moul, 98 Pa. 13;
League v. Waring & Co., 85 Pa. 244; 2
Parsons on Bills 184.
But the defendant contends that the
plaintiff was negligent in collecting by extending the time of the note three months.
Now whether the plaintiff was so negligent or whether he was not; whether the
amount of the note was lost through lack of
diligence such as an ordinarily prudent
business man under like circumstances
would exercise, or whether there was no
such want of diligence are for your consideration, gentlemen of the jury. They are
questions of fact with which we have
nothing to do; but if you want to find that,
for want of such care on the part of the
plaintiff, the note was lost, your verdict
must be for the defendant; for if the plaintiff received the note as collateral security
he was bound to use such diligence as the
ordinarily prudent business man would
exhibit in such a case and if he did not and
the note was lost he cannot recover. Sellers & McNichols v. Jones, 22 Pa. 423;
Kilpatrick v. B. & L. Association, 119 Pa.
30; Holmes & Son v. Drumm, 131 Pa. 233;
on the other hand if you find that the
plaintiff did exercise due diligence and
that.the note was not lost through any
lack of foresight or want of care, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover in the action
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brought and you will render a verdict accordingly.
M. J. RYAN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

If the Farnham note was unconditionally accepted by King in payment of Koenig's debt to him, King can have no recourse to Koenig, simply because that note
has not been paid. On the other hand, if
it was accepted as conditional payment, or
as collateral security, recourse to Koenig
is notipso facto precluded. Itmighthave
been shown that King received the Farnham note in payment,'but it was not. In
the absence of evidence of intention, it
must be presumed that that note was given
to King as collateral security or as a conditional payment. Hunter v. Moul, 98 Pa.
13; McCartney v. Kipp, 171 Pa. 644;
Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. 233; and the
court below has rightly held that suit on
the book account was not rendered impossible by reason of the assignment of that
note.
But the Farnham note has not been collected and cannot now be collected because
of his insolvency. It is suggested that the
delay in collecting this note is the cause of
the loss of it. The court below properly
assumed that the mere non-payment of
this note does not justify the refusal of a
recovery by King against Koenig. The
question is, whether that delay was the
result of a want of due diligence. The
delay lasted three months, but before the
expiration of that period -how soon before
does not appear-Farnham became insolvent. Under adequate instructions of the
court, the jury found that no lack of due
diligence was imputable to King.
There was an agreement between King
and Farnham that the latter should have
three months longer time in which to pay
the note. Had this been a valid agreement
we think it would have prevented recourse
by King against Koenig. If King desired
to maintain his right of action against
Koenig, he should have preserved his
ability to surrender the Farnham note to
Koenig at any time, on Koellig's tendering payment to him, and to reinvest Koenig with his original rights on that note.
But we do not find that there was any
valid consideration for the agreement to
delay. The $50 was a payment on account.

Ten dollars were paid for the delay. But
the law treats this as paid on account of
the debt, and does not regard it as making
the agreement for delay binding. Johnson
v. Thomas, 2 Forum 115. Hence despite
King's agreement with Farnham. he cQuld
have sued the latter at any time, and what
he coultl have done, Koenig on paying
King could have done.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN ROTH vs. SAMUEL SAMES.
Statute of frauds-Conveyance of land,Specific performance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Sames, owning a lot, and no other, on
W. Louther street, Carlisle, orally agreed
to sell itto Henry Newcome for$400. Newcome paid down $100, and Sames gave a
receipt as follows:
Carlisle, Aug. 11, '99.
Received of Henry Newcome $100 on account of price of lot on W. Louther street,
Carlisle, viz., $400, a deed of which I am to
make on the payment of the remaining
$300.
It is shown that at the time of making
this receipt, Sames gave a draft of a lot,
showing W. Louther street and adjoiners
on the east and west, but that Newcome
has since lost this draft. Newcome sold
the lot to Roth and informed Sames of the
sale. Roth tendered the remaining $300
with interest from August 11, '99, and requested a deed. Sames, on Nov. 12, '99,
refused to make the conveyance.
SHELLENBERGER and ROBITAILLE' for
the plaintiff.
The receipt is sufficient-The Act of 1772
requires only a writing showing that there
is a contract.-Colt v. Selden, 5 Watts 528;
Lowry v. Mehaffey, 10 Watts 389; Soles v.
Hickman, 20 Pa. 180.
The description of lot in receipt is sufficient.-Ross v. Baker, 72 Pa. 18f3; Smith's
Appeal, 69 Pa. 474.
YEAGER and TAYLOR for the defendant.
A receipt in part payment by which the
terms of the contract are not defined is not
enough to take the transaction out of the
Statute of Frauds.-Soles v. Hickman, 20
Pa. 180; Irvin v. Bull, 4 Watts 287; Allen
v. Allen, 45 Pa. 468.
. OPINION OF THE COURT.

By an Act approved March 21, 1872,
known as the "Statute of Frauds," it is
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provided in substance that "no estate in
lands excepting leases for three years shall
be assigned, granted or surrendered unless
it be by deed or note in writing signed by
the parties so assigning, granting or surrendering the same, or their agents thereto
lawfully authorized in writing or by act or
operation of law."
The question in the present case is
whether the receipt of Sames to Newcome
is a substantial compliance with the Act of
Assembly above referred to. In the receipt
given by the former to the latter, the price
to be paid is named and the portion received by the vendor at the time the same
was executed. The borough and street of
the same on which the same is located are
also set forth. Besides, a draft was also
given by thA vendor to the vendee naming
the adjoiners on the east and west, the
street named running between these two
points of the compass.
The Act of.1872 does notrequire the writing to be under seal.-Colt v. Selden, 5 W.
528.
"Any memorandum or writing indicative of the intent of the parties and so precise as to enable the inquirer to ascertain

the terms of the contract, the land to be
conveyed and the price to be paid for it is
a sufficient contract in writing to be enforced specifically."-Appeal of McFarson
1 Jones 503.
A receipt which embraces these essentials is sufficient.-Lower v. Mehaffey, 10
Watts, 389; Ross v. Baker, 172 Pa. 186.
In Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa. 190, cited
by the defendant, no price was mentioned
in the writing.
Newcome being entitled to enforce a
conveyance of the lands against Sames his
alienee, John Roth, the plaintiff, has alike
right.-Rhodes v. Frick, 6 Watts 315.
The question intended to be raised in this
case was whether under the Statute of
Frauds the writing was such as would sustain an action against the defendant for
specific performance, and the accident that
the date named as the one on which the
demand was made happened to be on Sunday is not material.
The defendant is therefore required to
make a deed to the plaintiff and a formal
decree to that effect will be prepared by
his ,attorney.
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